Eternity before time?

I would here give an argument, that eternity cannot be a "moment before time" because this would make eternity a part of time. For the purpose of this argument we will first define time and make an argument for a supra-temporal God. After this we will divide time into two categories (one real and one imagined) and then argue that to think of eternity as a point "before" time in a linear fashion would be to misunderstand eternity.

Time is best described as the distance between two fixed points of space. More presicsely it is the relationship of a thing (traditionally matter, but not necessarily so) between two fixed points in space. This is how we divide and understand time. The time it takes for me to move from my chair to the door is a measure of my matter moving through two fixed points of space. Without space or substance, we could not speak of time.

Unless we would have God (as he existed before creation, in his original position) existing in a fixed spacial point; then we are bound to confess that time does not exist for God. For, as previosuly stated, to have time you must have substance and at least two different points of space through which the substance has existed. This would mean that one of God's attributes would be spacial existance within two fixed points.

Scripture excludes the possibiility that God might be spacial (Psa. 139:7-8, 2 Chron. 2:6) or that he exists within time (Jam. 1:17, Psa. 90:4, 2 Pet. 3:8, Rev. 21:6). We should therefore also affirm that He exists outside of space or time and that these are part of his creation, not a precondition of his existence or essential attributes of his nature.

Remember that we said that time is a description of the relationship between substance and two fixed points in space. Now lets construct a model to show this relationship.

(A)---->----->----->--(SUBSTANCE)---->------->------>----->---(B)

(A) is the first point in space, (B) is the second, the arrows show the relationship between Substance and the points as it is in motion between them. This is actual time.

Suppose for a moment this model was all the time that had ever existed, because the two fixed points were the only two points of space possible. Now we might ask what if anything can come before or after these points (A) and (B)? Can we logically concieve of something beyond these two points? I think the answer is yes! We can concieve of a potential time, or a third possible point of space.

{c} - - - (A)---->----->-->--(SUBSTANCE)---->------->----->---(B)

Notice here that the lower case {c} is not an actual point, just a potential one, we can now describe not only the actual time between A and B but the potential time between either (A) and {c} or (B) and {c}. While this doesn't exist actually, in potential it could. So if we give a value of 10 between the distance of (A) and (B) we might also give a potential value of 3 between (A) and {c}. So long as this point {c} has no content or substance, it is but a potential time, but the moment we give it substance it becomes actual time.

If God exists in a linear sense before time at some point {c} than we have an intractable problem; for if God exists at point {c} then the point has substance and it seems that God is within time actually (not just potentially.) This means that time would become an essential attribute of God.

If God was temporal, then, we have further problems. Namely, if temporality is an essential attribute of God, then to be temporal he must have at least two reference points. It might be the case that these loci are the beginning of creation (A) and His aseic existence (B). This, however, would make creation a necessary condition for his existence, because as stated before if time is an essential attribute of who he is and if time needs two points and if creation is the other point then it must always have existed and it must always continue to exist for God to exist. Not only this, but what do we call something which has always existed, except for God himself, and so creation would become part of the substance of God, an intractable problem.

Another possible answer for a temporally extant God would be to use the Trinity to gain at least two (or as is the case three) reference points, but remember these must be points within space, which would mean the ontological Trinity is confined within and defined by a spacial relationship between one person and the other. Not only would this lend towards various ancient heresies which divided the persons of the trinity, but it would make God existing locally; not illocally.

The only answer then is that God exists beside of time in a special sense, not before time in a linear sense. To affirm otherwise would be to either make God have spacial content, or make the creation an essential part of God. Further work will be done on this blog to define how precisely God exists beside time, and what I mean by beside (to avoid reestablishing the linear model problems I just defeated). For now it suffices to say that God cannot exist in a linear fashion "before" time, without irrevocably damaging God's nature and his aseity.

Simulapsarianism

The name of the blog, as well as the soteriology to which I ascribe (and so far as I know I pioneered) ought to explained first. By A temporal eternalism I seek to designate the lack of temporality within my view of eternalism. This on the surface seems to be no large task within the realm of theological thought or that of philosophy of time. Calvin, in seeking to distinguish the persons of the trinity, affirms that we "..must not seek in eternity a before or an after." [Institutes XIII-19] Yet we have theories of the order of divine decrees, which would assert some temporality to their generation. We have discussions about how God "before time" existed and was active in decretive decree. I believe that we have falsely assumed a philosophical paradigm and because of this the great controversy of arminianism and calvinism, of free-will and determinism, has been all along asking and responding to wrong questions. My contention is two-fold. First that one cannot place an "eternal moment" before time in a linear fashion, without having that moment be relegated to time itself. Hence most theology makes God supra-temporal, but not eternal, though a simple misthinking of the problem. Secondly, I contend that by properly viewing the nature of God as being not before but "beside" time we solve many problems. If we may read this framework as a hermeneutical presupposition, we can explain many of the intractable verses of scripture which lead to the false dichotomy of free-will and determinism. We all assume a framework in scripture, both as to how God speaks, and from where. If we assume that he speaks "from before" in a linear sense, then we are forced to assume one of two options. Option one is that He speaks authoritatively from before and hence the universe is deterministic. Therefore man does not have a volitional choice outside of his contingency, and when a scripture seems to imply that he does, we must reinterpret it to fit the argument. Statements such as; "Choose this day whom you will serve," or "God wills that all men be saved," must be understood by appeal to a warning without a well meant offer, or we must construct God as having two wills, or define "all" as "all the saved." These answers create more problems than they solve. The ohter choice is to see God's beforeness as contingent on man's free choice, hence he only foreknows, but does not determine man's choice in salvation. This creates problems with the sovereignty of God and with the efficacy of his power. Furthermore we must read scripture eisogetically. When scripture says "Esau have I loved and Jacob have I hated, from their birth" we must make special arguments about nations not people (Im not sure how hating a whole nation, rather than just one person, free's God from determinism) or if scripture speaks of God choosing, we must add "according to his extensive foreknowledge" simply for the sake of keeping our framework. In short I contend that both of the highly developed and defended systems of Calvinism and Arminianism have erred because of their presuppositions. Both assume a "God linearly before time" and hence both fail to properly read scrpiture or arrive at a cogent and fair understanding of the issue.
Properly, God is positionally before and co-existant with time, so that at every moment he is present, "alongside" of, but not before. This requires much explanation, which will follow on this blog, but the primary contention is that when we ask questions of the ordo salutis, such as "Does God's regeneration preceed or procede faith?" we make a false dichotomy. The answer is regeneration is immediately simultanious to faith, because God is not before but intimitly beside time. The divine decrees are neither infra or supra lapsarian, but simulapsarian...For God (sans incarnation) events occur simutaniously...they just are. So the moment I believe, I choose, I create by my own volitional free will choice, at this very precise moment eternally God determines, regenerates, and rescues me. My free-will is coterminous with God's sovreign decree, so that I might neither rob God of his power, nor portray him as a mysterious and capricious God.